The Devil’s Bargain

I recently came across this short film titled The Devil’s Bargain created by students whose school is in proximity to RMA:

 

The National Contingency Plan


Confusing letters between us gals on the RMA Subcommittee and the EPA on 10 x -6 risk and Superfund.

Readers are advised to scan over 40 CFR 300 before reading our letters [NOTE: our assumption was that cleanup standards/cancer risk for RMA would follow 10 x -6 as outlined in the National Contingency Plan, not 10 x -4 as applied to the Arsenal and in many CERCLA cleanups].

first letter | EPA response | SC response…then we gave up.

Lots of RMA History

History, lots of history…

  • The Blue Book (Parts 1 and 3 not included).
  • CDPHE [1995] Citizen Health Summary.
  • CDPHE press release on the 10th Circuit decision.
  • Chemical agent program history [no author – a contractor doc?].
  • City and County of Denver comments on the Onpost proposed plan.
  • Colorado Dept. of Health [1975], Chemicals & spills.
  • Colorado Dept. of Health [1993], concerns, Offpost Proposed Plan.
  • Conceptual_Agreement, Sierra Club comments, [1995].
  • Corrective Action Management Unit, Sierra Club comments to CDPHE, [1996]: The Arsenal was one of the first federal facilities to reinvent cleanup via CAMU. It is my understanding the original intent of the CAMU was to provide a framework for the development and use of alternative and innovative technologies by allowing flexibility in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Rule (LDRs). But at one time, the use of CAMU subverted the LDRs rule by allowing untreated dioxin laden waste landfilled without treatment. This capricious misapplication of the rule is contrary to the law, and was not the intent of Congress, the EPA and the Colorado Hazardous Waste Commission which promulgated LDRs. EPA changed requirements in 2002 [see 3.3 of this EPA doc].
  • Department of the Army [1970], Review and Analysis.
  • Draft EIS, USFWS wildlife refuge, Sierra Club comments to USFWS [1995].
  • Daigle v. Shell Oil.

RMA & Shell Oil

Perhaps the most controversial party to RMA cleanup, on April 30, 1952, Shell Oil purchased Julius Hyman & Company, which manufactured “high-potency insecticides.” Hyman officially became integrated into Shell on January 1, 1955. [see Kendall Beaton’s Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957].

A few scanned files:

The Puzzling Case of the NSCMP and RMA

In 2000, a press release was drafted from us gals in Sierra Club and the Chem Weapons Working Group (CWWG ) asking the Army to consider alternate means of disposing of sarin bomblets. At the time, the Army was using open detonate “technology” for dealing with potentially unstable materiel, setting off the bomblets in the Arsenal acreage. While we understood the volatility of these weapons and urgency of disposal, open air detontation of Sarin bomblets compromised air quality, public health, and the safety of neighborhoods surrounding RMA.

After much discussion between Colorado Department of Health and Environment (CDPHE), Army, and the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency’s Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP), the Explosive Device System (EDS) was brought to the Arsenal from its testbed in Porton Down, UK, as an alternative technology to replace open detonation of bomblets and crude air and weather monitoring.

A huge part of the EDS story involves the NSCMP in providing me with an on the ground education in understanding programmatic authority and other issues involved in using the EDS at RMA. Below are behind the scenes conversations between the CDPHE and myself about the bomblets, NSCMP authority, and the EDS:

my original email | CDPHE response EDS | additional EDS discussion

Also relevant to the EDS discussion is the NSCMP’s Survey and Analysis Report, (2nd ed.); note the section on the Arsenal, but yet the NSCMP’s role was relegated to observer status in Arsenal cleanup. This was of constant amazement (and consternation) to many citizens who served on the Arsenal’s Restoration Advisory Board and the Site Specific Advisory Board. The existence of this report – issued BEFORE the Arsenal’s Record of Decision – would have influenced a better informed cleanup and indeed strengthened the programmatic authority of the NSCMP in working on other nonstockpile sites throughout the country. The history of NSCMP participation on former chem weapons sites remains compelling case study into (I think) DoD, and specifically, Army culture.

Wildlife [exposure & biomonitoring] and RMA

Worker Health & Safety

Very little information has been released by the Army on the health of former Rocky Mountain Arsenal workers. I wondered about this…but then I began to study secrecy. Late one September night as I was reading Chapter 13 of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, my eye caught the following paragraph and subsequent footnote(s) [emphasis-added]:

In the case of research related to chemical and biological warfare, the military issued a secret edict that published articles be cleansed of any reference to military purpose. [70] In many cases the opportunity to obscure the full purpose of research by careful wording was obvious.

As a DOD document put it, “the term ‘radiobiology’ is so flexible semantically that, depending upon the investigator’s point of view, any project could be classified as ‘clinical’ or ‘basic’ or ‘nuclear weapons effects.’ ” [71]

Footnotes to the above quote:

70. W. G. Lalor, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., 3 September 1952 (“Security Measures on Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare”) (ACHRE No. NARA-012495-A), 2. In the memo to the service chiefs of staff, the Joint Chiefs decreed that “responsible agencies” should “[e]nsure, insofar as practicable, that all published articles stemming from the BW [biological warfare] or CW [chemical warfare] research and development programs are disassociated from anything which might connect them with U.S. military endeavor.

71. Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Thirtieth Joint Medical Research Conference, minutes of 8 January 1964 (ACHRE No. DOD-062994-A), 3.

` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

In a previous work, I stressed that bureaucratic language is essentially linked to power; language, coupled with outright omissions of information,  can be used to  conceal  information.  By applying the broad category of “radiobiology” or  “cleansing” the literature of any reference to the military experimentation or projects, the military undermined the time-honored practice of scientific peer review as well as obfuscated informed consent of volunteers and the public’s right to know of the military’s [covert] contribution to the research literature.

This manipulation of language – not an uncommon occurrence as a technique of secrecy keeping – jeopardizes historical understanding and sorely tarnishes public confidence in government research. This situation calls to [my] mind sociologist Max Weber’s observation in Economy and Society, where Max asks

“…how can there be any guarantee that any powers will remain which can check and effectively control the influence of this stratum? How will democracy even in this limited sense be possible at all?”

With this in mind, consider the following:

Look over the Department of the Army, RMA Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter 1970, a doc I received under FOIA. The doc mentions demil and two projects: Project GEMS and Project LEACHE [Long Term Effects Anticholinesterase.] There is no mention of informed consent on the 148 “exposed personnel.” I wonder: were the workers mentioned in the LEACHE study the “industrial workers” of the Holmes and Metcalf study (below)?

The Metcalf and Holmes study, (June 23, 1969, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences), which disingenuously characterizes the study as “industrial and agricultural workers” exposed to pesticides. RMA [chemical weapons] workers are a component of the study cryptically indicated by “RMA” (circled) printed on Table 1.

At the January 26, 2000 EPA [Bob Martin] Ombudsman’s hearing on RMA, Dr. Robert McFarland testified to treating Sarin-exposed workers at Colorado General Hospital during the late 1950s while a resident. The medical school (University of Colorado), McFarland said, was doing a Army funded study on an antidote to Sarin exposure using 2PAM, or pyridine 2-aldoxime; this antidote was investigated as an alternative to the traditionally used atropine in cases of sarin poisoning. Dr. McFarland reported the physicians who administered the study were ordered by their dean to participate as the medical school “was so hard up for money after World War II we had to take any study we could get.” [Thanks to Dr. McFarland for providing this document].

Miscellaneous McFarland correspondence on RMA worker exposure studies were a “cover” for testing a Sarin antidote, 2-PAM.  Workers eventually sued the University of Colorado.

Former RMA worker Ray Laughbridge tells his story in Denver magazine September, 1976. Note: Dr. Joseph Holmes of the Metcalf and Holmes study worked for the Army Chemical Service.

Women & RMA

Some interesting historical things from my files; At its peak, the Arsenal employed 3,100 civilians, including WAC officers assigned to do war work.

TX Anticrop Agent & Project 112

From January 1962-October 1969, Rocky Mountain Arsenal “grew, purified and biodemilitarized” plant pathogen wheat stem rust [Puccinia graminis, var. tritici] for the Air Force. TX-treated grain was grown at the Arsenal from 1962-1968 in Sections 23-26. Unprocessed TX was also transported from Beale AFB for purification, storage, and disposal.

The following docs outline these activities at RMA:

The point is that there is still 90.00 pounds of TX located in the northern portion of the Arsenal. Considering the trouble and money involved in the demil of TX it would seem stupid to ignore that agent. If the government decided to leave it there it would appear that this should be questioned due to the cost already expended and the amount of effort that had been expended. If the government were to say there was no danger with the TX then why was such effort then take to contain the already dead agent?

Question for researchers: Was the visit by Japanese scientists to RMA connected in any way to Project 112, which also field tested wheat rust in Okinawa?

Summary of Major Events and Problems

When researching the history of Rocky Mountain Arsenal several years ago, I requested and received under FOIA The Summary of Major Events and Problems and The Summary History of Chemical Corps Activities. Both sets of reports reveal a rich history of the Chemical Corps weapons complex, which include details of field and logistical exercises, facilities, the Tripartite conferees (U.S. Canada, and the UK), common work in chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare, and genetic research. The documents also chronicle the Corps’ involvement in weapons R & D and classified projects related to CBR warfare post World War II through the Cold War. The Chemical Corps, an agency created out of the War Gas Investigations research unit in 1917, was dissolved August 1, 1962. These files were originally hosted at Russ Kick’s Memory Hole.

By gathering this set together for the first time on the Web, it is my hope researchers will be encouraged to submit their own Freedom of Information Act requests on obscure projects and  programs mentioned throughout the reports in an attempt to “detoxify the sources of our scholarship.” **

※※※※※

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1961-62, June 1962)
summhist_1961-2p1-66
| summhist_1961-2p67-126 | summhist_1961-2p127-end

Of note: Project 112 (p.11,98); “another of Mr. McNamara’s projects, Project 80 (p. 16); CBR agency mission (p.20); public information program (p.33+); development of simulants (p.69); Project Scorpion and Wasp (p.70); genetic factors (p.127).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1960, April 1961)
summhist_1960p1-70
| summhist_1960p71-140| summhist_1960p141-end

Of note: 462 acres of land SW acquired by the city of Denver for Stapleton Airport (p.45); field and logistical exercises (p. 91+); Tripartite conferees (107); incapacitating agent Serynl turned over to the Corps by Parke, Davis and Company (p.113); anticrop research (p.121).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1959, January 1960)
summhist_1959_p1-72
| summhist_1959_p73-149 |summhist_1959_p150-end

Of note: General Stubbs “urgent need for strong posture on CBR warfare” (p.6); Black Magic tear and riot program (p.97, 147); BW pathogens (p. 98+); BW spray contract to North American Aviation Inc, six trials run Dugway, one with Q fever (p.107);introduction of “property accountability into the radioactive waste disposal facilities” (p.141); Chem Corp disposed of 225 tons of rad waste (p.175); burning of “excess” mustard gas (p.175).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1958, March 1959)
summhist_1958_p1-60
| summhist_1958_p61-132 | summhist_1958_p133-end

Of note: Chemical Corps expands activities for the conduct of “Radiological Warfare and Radiological defense” (p.44); “antipersonnel BW an ideal weapon” (p.52); Chemical Corps Intel Agency (CCIA; p.82); CBR reports on Soviet production of G and V agents (p. 85); K agents conducted using a derivative of Lysergic Acid (“the men paid little attention to their leaders commands”; p. 100); the Kharasch program at U. of Chicago (p.101); academic institutions contracted (p. 103-4); anticrop agents (p.105); M35 bomb cluster at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (p. 149).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1957)
chem-corps_summary_1957

Of note: The Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency (CCIA; p. 84-87); A chart states that as of 30 June 1956, the Chemical Corps had received R&D funds totaling $10,000 from the National Security Agency (p.88);  “For example, in the Development Schedule for Lethal-Type Biological Antipersonnel Systems the objective (target area) by FY 1959 is 1 to 5 square miles;… by 1966, 1,000 to 100,000 square miles” (p.92);  “In February 1957 the Research and Development Command selected VX as the agent upon which to concentrate” (p.94); “In 1951 the Corps awarded a contract to the New York State Psychiatric Institute to investigate the clinical effects of mescaline and its derivatives. The contractor tested six derivatives, the Chemical Warfare laboratories tested thirty-five” (p. 97-98);  “The program is expected to be a long-term project, ad the ultimate goal is to determine whether Lysergic Acid Diethylamide [LSD] can be used as an effective chemical warfare agent” (p.98); Discusses the phasing out of research into anticrop warfare (it was to become the Air Force’s responsibility; p.103); BW research on “volunteer” troops (p.104).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1956)
chem-corps_summary_1956a | chem-corps_summary_1956b | chem-corps_summary_1956c

Of note: “[T]he Corps aided CONARC [Continental Army Command] in contingency plans for the employment of an airborne division and an airborne corps in the Middle East” (p.88-9);  “(S) As of 30 June 1956, the Chemical Corps had a total of fifty-seven active units…. The officers and men in these 57 units numbered 4,763” (p.94); Organizational charts (p.117-25);  “In the closing months of the previous year, the Corps established a new subproject, 4-08-03-016-05, Psychochemical Agents, in an effort to uncover compounds that would cause temporary mental and/or motor incapacitation of enemy soldiers or civilians” (p. 128-9);  “(S) At Fort Detrick the screening and evaluation of bacteria, fungi, viruses, and rickettsiae produced additional information…” (p.138);  “Cereal rusts received the greatest emphasis among anticrop agents, particularly in regard to dissemination and spread” (p.140).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1955)
chem-corps_summary_1955a | chem-corps_summary_1955b

Of note: Mentions the extremely obscure nerve agent VP, which the Corps had synthesized and designated as a “candidate” for chemical warfare (p.47);  “In May 1955 the Corps established a new subproject, ‘4-08-03-016-05, Psychochemical Agents,’ with the short title, MM-1605, to uncover and develop promising agents [capable of affecting the mind]…. Under this subproject, compounds were to be synthesized, and then screened to ascertain their value in causing symptoms of delusion, hallucination, mania, delirium, psychosis, depression, suicidal tendencies, paralysis, incoordination, convulsions, listlessness, weakness, headache, nausea, dizziness, defects in hearing, sight, or judgment, and cutaneous disorders like urticaria” (p.48-9);  “During FY 1955 three new organisms were chosen for screening…” (p.59); “Final research tests were conducted on a pathogen for rice and a pathogen for potatoes (p.60); “One of the most important defensive measures which the Corps investigated as the protection of civilians and soldiers by means of a smoke screen against the intense heat evolved during the explosion of an atom bomb” (p.62); “Total agent [GB] production for the fiscal year was approximately 898,000 gallons” (p.141).

Summary of Major Events and Problems” (Fiscal Year 1954)
chem-corps_summary_1954 | chem-corps_annex_1954

Tactical BW system requirement to be included in maneuvers and CPX (command post exercise); “chemical annexes” not communicated to NATO (p.2); “toxics” shipped to the Far East (p.3); EXERCISE BROWN DERBY (p.4=5); Chemical Corp BW plan developed at Camp Detrick (BW and vaccines) with a contract to a “medical school” (p.6); B. anthracis development at Vigo, Indiana (p. 7); aerosol tests at Hollman AFB, along with R and D of other BW agents (p.8); projects involving poultry, swine, horses, and ruminats were discontinued. Plum Island and Kenya continued (p.9).

Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1953)
chem-corps_summary_1953

Of note: A feature of General Creasy’s visit to the Far East was a meeting with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek on Formosa. The Chinese leader was particularly interested in defense against possible BW attack (p.18); Discovery of a variety of agents for munitions including those utilizing waste fission products and hence not competing with the atomic program (p.30).

 

Summary History of the Chemical Corps Activities (9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952), February 1953.
summhist_sept91951to_dec311952

Of note: Chem Corps facilities (p.8); Korea (p.26-31); Three new intelligence publications (p.36).

 

Summary History of the Chemical Corps (25 June 19508 September 1951)
chem-corps_june1950sept1951

Of note: “The opening of hostilities in Korea found the Chemical Corps unprepared for war, although there was a nucleus of well-trained personnel and adequate quantities of defensive equipment” (p.3); “At the end of World War II, the Allies learned the secrets of the new powerful German nerve gases, which are now in production in the United States – and probably in Russia” (p.4); “The field of biological warfare was represented by several items. Agent TX was the first anti-crop pathogen standardized by the Chemical Corps. Normally employed with the M1 agent carrier, it was very effective against cereal crops (p.13).

_______________________
** Blanche Wiesen Cook,  “Presidential Papers in Crisis: Some Thoughts on Lies, Secrets, and Silence,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (1996): 285-92.

I am not certain if these reports are part of RG 175.